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OPINION 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
for the Committee on the Rules of Procedures, the Verification 
of Credentials and Immunities 
Draftsman: Mr Alexander LANGER 
At its meeting of 23 September 1992 the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Security appointed Mr Langer draftsman. 
At its meetings of 16 October 1992, 24 November 1992 and 3 December 1992 it 
considered the draft opinion. 
At the last meeting it adopted the conclusions as a whole by 16 votes to 1. 
The following ·took part in the vote: Catherwood, acting chairman; Langer, 
draftsman; Aglietta, Avgerinos, Bertens, Ib Christensen (for Canavarro), 
Ferrer i Casals (for Lacaze), Habsburg, Jepsen, Lenz, Llorca Vilaplana, 
Magnani Noya, Oostlander (for Penders), Pack (for Pirkl), Prag (for Bethell), 
Suarez Gonzalez (for Fernandez Albor) and Titley. 
DOC_EN\RR\232\232653 
- 3 - PE 205.944/fin./Part II 
I. !NTRODUCTION 
1. In the light of the prov1s1ons of the Treaty on European Union concluded in 
Maastricht, the capacity for political initiative and action of the European 
Community - which is to become the Union - will have to increase and develop. 
1he difference compared with the present state of affairs will ba particularly 
noticeable in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
will mean that the European Parliament too - despite the deplorably narrow scope 
of its powers will need to have greater capacity to exercise its 
responsibilities in this area. 
This will be reflected in almost all aspects of parliamentary activity and will 
require Parliament to be readier to act, more responsive, more prompt, more 
flexible and more able to exercise its (albeit limited) powers and genuine 
democratic political control. In short, the provisions of Maastricht on the 
CFSP call for a more politicized Parliament, perhaps less weighed down by 
'technical' and detailed tasks and instead readier to give political stimulus 
to the executive and verify and criticize its acthities. 
This may require a better distribution of work between part-sessions and the 
work of parliamentary committees, which will lead to changes and innovations in 
almost all fields of activity covered by the Rules of Procedure. The running 
of Parliament may have to become more incisive (the President's possibility of 
meeting and consulting with the chairmen of the political groups at short 
notice, frequently and without too many formalities will have to be enhanced so 
that he can constantly monitor the situation and draw th~ appropriate 
conclusions). 
2. At present the European Parliament works on the basis of rules and 
procedures which make it very difficult for it to react promptly to events, 
inform the Council and the Commission effectively of its political views and 
meet whenever the international political situation requires. This became clear 
when Kuwait was invaded, when the Gulf war broke out, during the course of the 
Yugoslav crisis and in the case of Somalia etc. Being able to meeting only on 
a fixed date and not to have any other way of expressing a precise and binding 
opinion on a political situation has forced Parliament on many occasions to fall 
back on restrictive procedures which are not appropriate for .taking decisions 
with a proper debate and vote. It is a mistake to imagine that under these 
conditions prompt and effective 'recommendations' can be issued in accordance 
with Article J.7 of the Maastricht Treaty, unless new procedures and instruments 
are introduced. 
All this opens up a vast area of new responsibilities, which will require a 
decisive development in the activities and decision-making capacities of the 
parliamentary committee responsible for ·dealing with foreign and security 
policy. 
In various other areas of parliamentary activity, such as questions, urgent 
resolutions, the debate and vote approving the appointment of the Commission, 
the whole field of accession treaties and association agreements, other 
international agreements which Parliament considers to be of major importance 
and the whole area of security policy, which will involve relations with the 
WEU, adjustments to the Rules of Procedure will have to take specific account 
of the implications deriving from the new provisions of thg CFSP. 
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3. In short, it will be necessary to ensure that Parliament's capacity to 
exercise its powers deriving from Article J. 7 of the Maastricht Treaty is 
~tructured in the best possible way and organized efficiently as far as the 
Rules are concerned: provision must be made for it to be consulted on the main 
aspects of and the fundamental decisions involved in the common foreign and 
security policy, it must be able to· express clearly and promptly those 
'opinions' which the presidency of the Council is to take into due 
consideration; it must be equipped to be 'regularly informed by the Pre~idency 
and the Commission of the development of the Union's foreign and security 
policy'; it must be able not only to 'ask questions of the Council or make 
recommendations to it' and 'hold an annual debate on progress in implementing 
the common foreign and security policy' but also to verify the action taken on 
its recommendations and demand prompt and non-evasive answers to its questions. 
The following proposals are intended to serve these purposes. 
II. REASONS FOR THE AMENDMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS 
4. In order to ensure that the above happens, an essential instrument is the 
incorporation in its own Rules of Procedure of the provisions of the Treaty on 
Political Union referring to the common foreign and security policy; these are 
found mainly in Title V, which includes Articles J-J. 11, a::; well as the 
provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community which regulate 
these fields. 
Another important instrument is interinstitutional negotiations, which will 
develop and supplement these provisions. 
As regards the regulation of the common foreign and security policy in the 
Parliament's internal rules, this committee would like to make a number of 
comments and propose a number of amendments. 
5. It might be appropriate for the Committee on the Rules of Procedure to study 
the amendment we propose to Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure, which concerns the 
convening of Parliament. 
In the event of an emergency, the cases provided for in Rule 9 ( 5) second 
subparagraph could be extended to enable Parliament to be convened at the 
request of a committee or a political group as well as at the request of one 
third of its current members. 
we agree that Rule 57 should be repealed, since its contents are transferred to 
the new Rules 125a and b which we propose in our amendments. 
As regards Rules 58, 59, 60, 61 and 62, the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty 
do not appear to have any immediate consequences. Nevertheless we would 
emphasize the importance of the political dialogue on the CFSP established 
between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission •Tia the tabling 
of questions. Obviously much will depend on the discretion of the Enlarged 
Bureau, which will be responsible for ensuring that plenary is sufficiently 
involved in matters concerning the CFSP, by trying to short~n the deadlines for 
the inclusion of questions on the agenda (currently five weeks in the case of 
questions put to the Council). It will be advisable f~r appropriate 
interinsti tutional dialogue to ensure the proper participation and prompt 
response of the institutions concerned. 
DOC_EN\RR\232\232653 - 5 - PE 205.944/fin./Part II 
Despite these suggestions, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 4oes 
not intend to table amendments to these Rules. 
6. As regards accession treaties (Rule 32) and association treaties (Rule 33), 
the experience of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security and the fonae:r: 
Political Affairs Committee suggests that one should consider the need, 
mentioned on numerous occasions, to have two formal opportunities of expressing 
a political opinion. This means that, in addition to the opinion delivered 
after an accession or association treaty has been signed, but before it has been 
ratified by the national parliaments, Parliament should be given the opportunity 
to express its opinion to the Council and the Commission. 
In the case of accession agreements, it would be extremely useful if the 
European Parliament could express its opinion after the report by the committee 
responsible and after the application for accession has been submitted, and thus 
influence or provide some guidelines for the process of accession. 
With regard to association agreements, it would be useful if the committee 
responsible were able, at any moment between the beginning of negotiations and 
the ratification of the treaty in question, to draw up and submit to plenary a 
report giving its opinion, in which it could exercise its supervisory function 
vis-a-vis the Council and the Commission. 
It would therefore be appropriate to amend Rule 33(3al (as p~oposed by Mr Prout 
in his report) to extend the scope of the term 'negotiations' and replace it by 
'throUghout the wbole process up until ratification ... '. 
The same amendment should be made to Rule 32(4), replacing the words 'When the 
negotiations are completed' by the words 'Throughout the whole process up until 
ratification'. 
The only difference in treatment consists in the fact that in the case o.f 
association treaties it is the Commission which does the negotiating whereas the 
Member States are-responsible for accession Treaties. Nevertheless, and in case 
the foregoing might create legal obstacles to Parliament's making 
recommendations (in the case of accession treaties), there is nothing to stop 
it from adopting resolutions after the debate provided for under the present 
Rule 32 has been held. Such resolutions might help the national parliaments to 
define their positions. 
These proposed amendments will lead to better control over the negotiation and 
ratification of these agreements, which are of paramount importance for the 
Community. We agree with the amendments proposed by Mr Prout in every other 
respect. 
We have a slight reservation with regard to the last paragraph of Rule 33. 
Since the Treaty on European Union only requires a simply majority for the 
adoption of these agreements and this· seems to us to constitute excessively 
loose control, we propose that such votes· should always be held after one 
requiring a qualified majority. This amendment, which we acknowledge to be 
dubious from the legal point of view, could be replaced by the Committee on the 
Rules of Procedure, and a high quorum could be set for the adoption of such 
agreements. This solution seems more suitable and reliable, since it would 
prevent situations arising whereby, for example, such agreements could not pe 
voted on at an extraordinary sitting at which there is there is no provision for 
qualified majority voting. 
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7. The second subparagraph of Article 228(3) of the Maastricht Treaty states 
that association agreements and other types of agreement listed in it are to be 
concluded after the assent of the EP has been obtained, assent having been given 
by a simple majority (since there is no provision to the contrary). For 
organizational reasons one Rule (33) is devoted to accession and other 
significant agreements are covered in Rule 34. However the procedure and the 
importance assigned to them in the Treaty are comparable; they should therefore 
be dealt with in the same way. There is no reason for them to be declared to be 
significant. since importance is already assigned to them by the Treaty. 
This is what is proposed in our amendment No. 4 (Rule 34(1)). 
Nevertheless, if considered appropriate, the possibility of declaring an 
agreement (of a kind not covered by Rules 32, 33 and 34(1)) significant for 
Parliament or the Community could be maintained and it could be ascigned special 
treatment. 
If this system seems appropriate, it could be laid down in paragraphs 2, 3 and 
4 of Rule 34, as proposed in our amendment No. 4. 
This would allow greater parliamentary control, with better guarantees, over 
commercial and/or cooperation agreements or any agreements not included among 
those covered in earlier Rules or in Rule 34 (1). 
8. We shall now consider the proposals made by Mr Vecchi in his report, which 
directly refer to the common foreign and security policy. 
Our committee approves of creating a new Chapter XIII to deal with the common 
foreign and security policy deriving from the Maastricht Treaty. 
The commit tee agrees that the expression 'European Political Cooperation' should 
be deleted from all the provisions of the Rules of Procedure, and be replaced 
by 'common foreign and security policy', and, when it is referred to as an 
institution, it should be replaced by 'the Council'. 
With regard to Rule 125a (new), the committee has several suggestions to make 
and proposes one amendment, which will be found in the second part of this 
opinion. 
With regard to the title (Consultation of Parliament), we believe it would be 
more suitable, in order to make it coincide with Article J.7, first paragraph 
and the contents thereof, to call it 'Consultation of and provision of 
information to the European Parliament'. 
We should point out that the use of the plural in paragraph 1 of Rule 125a (new) 
proposed by Mr vecchi is incorrect, when he says that 'the committees 
responsible for the various aspects of the common foreign and ~ecurity po+icy 
shall each ensure ... ' since at present the only committee responsible for the 
various aspects of the common foreign and security policy is the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Security. 
Secondly, we agree that this paragraph should be worded in such a way as to give 
the committee responsible the initiative, since it will act as a stimulus to 
this committee, which will be obliged to monitor continuously compliance with 
the obligation to consult Parliament on the CFSP and the response made to 
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Parliament's opj.nions by the other Community institutions, i.e .. tha Council and 
the Commission. 
At the end of this first paragraph we consider it appropriate to add the words 
'and the activities referred to in Article 228a of the EEC Treaty'. This 
article establishes that the Council shall take the necessary urgent measures 
to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one 
or more third countries; this is already seen as a foreign policy measure of 
great importance. We consider that Parliament should be consulted by the 
Council on such an important matter. 
9. We propose the insertion of a third paragraph saying that the Council will 
inform the committee responsible regularly and thoroughly about the development 
of the Union's foreign and security policy. 
All this paragraph does is to incorporate the end of the first paragraph of 
Article J.7 of the Maastricht Treaty, which says precisely this. 
Whilst in the consultations on the main aspects of the CFSP the committee 
responsible (as proposed in the first paragraph of Mr Vecchi's amendment) has 
the task of ensuring both that Parliament is consulted and that its opinion is 
acted upon, we consider it safer that the presidency and thP. Commission should 
be responsible for providing information on the development of the common 
foreign and security policy (incidentally this is what the Treaty says), without 
necessarily being requested to do so, according to procedures approved by the 
committee responsible and in a regular and detailed manner. 
This flow of information will have to be properly channelled towards the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security so that the latter can actually ensure 
compliance with the obligation to consult the European Parliament on basic 
foreign and security policy decisions. 
This is why the committee considers that the second subparaqraph of paragraph 
1 of Rule 125a as proposed by Mr vecchi should be replaced by the paragraph 3 
proposed in our amendment. 
10. We propose that in a new paragraph 4 the detailed rules for consulting and 
informing Parliament, as well as the procedures and timescale, should be 
included in an annex to the Rules of Procedure. This should be done after the 
necessary interinstitutional negotiations. 
It would also be appropriate to establish that the Council of the Western 
European Union should be obliged to inform the committee responsible regularly 
about those matters in which, in accordance with Article J. 4, the Western 
European Union is responsible for implementing the decisions and actions of the 
Union. 
For this purpose it might be appropriate to specify this in an new subparagraph 
in paragraph 3 of Rule 125a (new). 
11. With regard to Rule 125b (new) we agree both that it should be inserted and 
with the paragraph proposed by Mr VECCHI, but we feel that it should go at the 
end of the Rule, and give priority to the other faculty envisaged in Article 
J.7, second subparagraph of the Maastricht Treaty, i.e. Parliament's faculty to 
make recommendations to the Council. 
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The non-legislative and confidential nature of foreign policy means that the 
classic forms of consultation are unsuitable (hence the precautions and 
specifications _proposed above and the need for interinstitutional·negotiation 
afterwards). Whilst it is quite conceivable that the main policy documents of 
CFSP, such as the half-yearly work programme or the presidency's report, should 
be presented in plenary, it is unlikely that these procedures can be aVPlied to 
the numerous measures or declarations in this sphere (report by Mr VERDE I 
ALDEA, PE 201.471). 
Parliament would not be able to express its opinion with the required speed nor 
guarantee the confidentiality which the Council may wish. 
This is why we envisage the system outlined above, g1v1ng the committee 
responsible the initiative to ensure that Parliament is consulted on the basic 
decisions concerning the CFSP and giving it the instruments, in accordance with 
the obligation, laid down in the Treaty, to ensure that the presidency and the 
Commission inform Parliament regularly and exhaustively about these policies. 
Once it is acquainted with the policies it will be able to control them more 
effectively. 
If we do.not want this faculty to make recommendations to the Council, which can 
actually become extremely important, to remain a dead latter, it must be 
transferred to the committee responsible, provided that the circumstances or the 
deadlines so require. The Commission is a specialized forum for the Qiscussion 
of foreign policy and maintains permanent links with the presidency of the 
Council and with the Commission; it therefore seems to be the only way of 
properly implementing the faculty granted to Parliament in the Treaty. 
Parliament's faculty to make recommendations should be implemented by creating 
a fast channel via which the competent parliamentary body (the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Security) may rapidly formulate such recommendations on 
foreign and security policy. They would of course be subject to the supervision 
of plenary afterwards and would not interfere with individual political 
initiatives (Rule 63) or group initiatives (Rules 63 and 64 and the right of 
initiative) which will continue to be available as before. These already make 
it possible for political groups or members to propose recommendations which 
will of course, as Mr VECCHI proposes in his Rule 59a(2), be referred to the 
appropriate committee. 
The procedure proposed by Mr VECCHI is a valid one but, as we said before, we 
believe that the bases for its implementation already exist in the Rules of 
Procedure; what is proposed here is a new more specialized procedure, which we 
feel is of fundamental importance if Parliament's new faculty is to be exploited 
to the full. 
With regard to the co-existence of both procedures (the one proposed by 
Mr VECCHI and the one proposed by this committee) we feel that there is no 
reason why they should not co-exist since one of them is a general procedure and 
the other one a special procedure. each fulfilling a different need. 
Nevertheless, and in view of the fact that this faculty to make recommendations 
has already been given a special form and framework in the new chapter XIII on 
the common foreign and security policy, it might be appropriate, for practical 
reasons, not to insert the new article 59a, since control by plenary is already 
guaranteed - as we shall show below - and the channels via which members of 
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Parliament and political groups can express their views remain open a~1d 
unchanged. 
12. Furthermore, if we want the system laid down for making recom•nendations to 
work well, it should not only be coordinated with the faculty to deliver. 
opinions and receive information: the committee responsible must b~ aQl• to take 
the initiative in formulating recommendations whenever it considers that 
circumstances so require and it must, to this end, be able to meet whftAever it 
deems appropriate and necessqn. This is what we propose in tl'\e first 
subparagraph of paragraph 1 of Rule 125b (new). 
In connection with this, a second subparagraph is inserted into paragraph 1, 
aimed at reconciling a number of guarantees with the speed required in dealing 
with such policies. Thus the general guarantees (the calling of rfteetings, 
quorum etc.) and special guarantees (the need for a written text, the vote'and 
the possibility of tab.ling amendments) are reconciled with the need for the 
committee to meet, propose a text, discuss it and amend it in one single day -
or in an afternoon -; for this reason the text of the recorumendation need not 
be translated into all the languages at the time when it is discussed and it can 
be amended orally during the meeting, which means proposing a number of 
derogations from the general rules governing languages. 
These proposals are needed to enable the Committee on Foreign Aff'airs and 
Security to take advantage of the new faculty to draw up recommendations in an 
emergency situation without being constrained by translation deadlines. 
Ultimately, these provisions virtually mean. that, as regards the CFSP, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security is subject to the same rules governing 
languages as the Council and the Commission are in their work. 
On the other hand, once the text has been adopted in committee it will be 
subject to the general rules governing languages in order to be accepted in 
plenary. 
13. As regards the essential system of control by plenary, we believe that the 
one we propose is the simplest and most effective. When recommendations have 
been drawn up by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, owing to the 
pressure of time inherent in such policies, the President of Parliament will 
enter it on the agenda for the part-session immediately following the 
formulation of the recommendation and it will be considered as adopted unless 
it meets with strong opposition from the House - i.e. at least o~e-tenth of the 
current members of Parliament, belonging to three political groups. As can be 
seen, this form of opposition is already covered in Rule 37 of the Rules of 
Procedure and we feel it is appropriate (although the Committee on the Rules of 
Procedure may prefer a larger or smaller majority, depending on what it thinks 
fit). 
If there is opposition. the recommendation will be considered and put to the 
vote in plenary guring the same part-session. The vote will· be held on the 
recommendation as a whole in order to avoid the adverse effects of separate 
votes; it is inappropriate to accept amendments to such a recommendation: either 
it is adopted as whole or rejected. 
This mechanism is dealt with in the proposed second paragraph of Rule 125b 
(new). 
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14. We consider that there are valid reasons for creating a new rule in the 
Rules of Procedure for joint parliamentary delegations but it must be based, 
wherever possible, on the existing rules for parliamentary delegations (Rule 
126). 
Although we recognize their special requirements, we feel that joint eommittees 
should also be subject to the same rules as delegations (and also committees). 
As regards the second paragraph, if we want 'democratic control' to be achieved 
with a 'Community' parameter, it must be carried out by a Community body which, 
according to the present Rules of Procedure, is the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. 
The Committee on Foreign Affairs considers it inappropriate to include internal 
procedural rules for the joint committees in Parliament's Rules of Procedure; 
they must have their own internal rules, laid down by mutual agreement with 
their opposite numbers and approved subsequently by the European Parliament and 
the other parliament concerned. These internal rules must include the 
operational rules included by Mr VECCHI in his paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 (which we 
therefore propose to delete). 
As regard the 'policy' suggestions (Mr VECCHI's paragraph 7) ther~ are numerous 
regulatory instruments allowing members of joint committees to voice their 
opinions (Rules 63, 64, 65, 56, 58, 62, etc.). 
Paragraph 8: as regards the budgetary implications, new budget lines must be 
created by means of budget amendments and not amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure. 
In our opinion the Rule should include the prov~s~on on the election of members 
and the constitution of the Bureau of the committee: we suggest that wording 
similar to that of Rule 126(2) and (3) be used. 
We consider it would also be useful to insert a paragraph (similar to Rule 
126(5)) modified to enable the eo-chairmen of joint parliamentary committees to 
take part in the meetings of chairmen of delegations. 
We suggest the insertion of a final paragraph or the inclusion in the rules of 
what is now established practice, i.e. that the chairman of the joint committee 
must report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on its activities. 
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(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Rclicy 
for the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verificati9n 
of Credentials and Immunities 
Craftsman: Mr Panayot~s ROUMELIOTIS 
At its meeting of 17 March 1993 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
and Monetary Policy appointed Mr Panayotis Roumeliotis draftsman. 
At its meetings of 25 March 1993 in considered the draft opinion. 
At the latter meeting it adopted the conclusions as a whole unanimously. 
The following were present for the vote: Beumer, chairman; Patterson, vice-
chairman; Roumeliotis, rapporteur; Peter Beazley, Bofill Abeilhe, Braun-~oser 
(for von Wogau), de la Camara, .cassidy (for Christopher Jackson), Delcroix (for 
Caudron), Geraghty, Harrison, Herman, Lulling, Peters (for Roqalla}, Metten, 
Read, Siso Cruellas, Thyssen and von Wechmar. 
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1 . Introduction 
The Rules Committee is now considering three draft reports by Mr ROTHLEY 
(PE 202.024/rev.), Sir Christopher PROUT (PE 202.026/rev.) and Mr VECCHI 
(PE 201.810/rev.) on the necessary changes to Parliament's Rules of Procedure 
following adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. The 8 amendments adopted relate 
to issues of concern for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy that have not been sufficiently tackled in the three draft 
reports. A number of other amendments initially tabled by the draftsman were 
not considered of special relevance to the Economic Committee and hence, the 
draftsman would not table them in the name of the Committee. 
2. The Rules of Procedure and EMU 
The most important gap in the texts for the Economic Committee is that there has 
been no response to the_new EMU Articles, one of the most important aspects of 
the Maastricht Treaty. The European Parliament has not been given adequate 
powers to match these new Community competences, and so it is es~ential that our 
Rules of Procedure make the most of the few powers that we have been given. 
(i) Accountability of the Committee of Governors, European Monetary 
Institute and European Central Bank 
Article 109b of the Treaty provides for the President of the ECB to present its 
Annual Report to the European Parliament, which may hold a general debate on 
that basis. Moreover the President of the ECB and the other members of the 
Executive Board may, at the request of the European Parliament or on their own 
initiative, be heard by the competent Committees of the European Parliament. 
Commentary: These follow on similar provisions already established in the first 
stage of the EMU for the Chairman of the Committee of Central Bank Governors. 
Amendment No. 3 in the Vecchi report incorporates a statement by the President 
of the Court of Auditors on the Court's Annual Report. A similar provision 
should be included as regards the Committee of Governors, the EMI and the ECB 
(the lac~ of such a provision caused problems within the Parliar.1ent as regards 
the presentation of this year's Annual Report of the Committee of Governors). 
Amendment 2 seeks to remedy this situation. In addition the President of the 
EMI and later the ECB should be authorized to make other statements in plenary, 
at their request or at that of the Parliament, when circumstances so justify 
(monetary crisis, etc.) (see amendment 8). 
(ii) Information to be provided to the Parliament 
The EMU section of the Treaty has several references to information being 
provided to the Parliament: 
Article 73g. 2 on Council decisions concerning unilateral act:i.ons by a Member 
State against a third country in the field of capital movements and payments 
Article 103. 2, third paragraph, on Council recommendations on economic 
policy guidelines 
Article 103a.2, on financial assistance to a Member State 
Article 104c.11 on Council actions against Member States not implementing 
Council recommendations concerning their excessive deficits 
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Article 109.1 on the adoption, adjustment or abandonment of ECU central 
rates 
Article 1 09c. 3 concerning Council decisions on the composition of the 
Economic and Financial Committee 
eommentary: This is clearly unsatisfactory for the Parliament but the 
Parliament should make the most of it. There is no reference to this in our 
Rules of Procedure and this should be corrected. This issue is covered in 
amendment 7 (which also covers the issue of what happens when Parliament has not 
been formally consulted according to Rule 36 but where Parliament's opinion is 
expected in accordance with inter-institutional agreements within the Commission 
and/or the Council). 
(iii) Multilateral surveillance 
Article 103.4 provides for the President of the Council and the Commission to 
report to the European Parliament on the results of multilateral surveillance. 
Moreover the President of the Council may be invited to appear before the 
competent Committee of the European Parl.iament if the Council has made its 
recommendations public. 
eomaentary: It might well be useful to include a special provJ.sJ.on on 
multilateral surveillance within the Rules of Procedure (see amendment 5 in this 
context). 
(iv) Guidelines on tbe economic policies of tbe 'Member States and of the 
Community 
Formal agreements on monetary or exchange-rate regime matters 
These two specific sets of issues are covered in Amendments 4 and 6. 
(v) Confidentiality 
This is also an important issue in the EMU context. This refers to Annex VII 
of the Rules. In the view of your draftsman this does not just cover 
confidential documents but confidential procedures in 9eneral. It should thus 
be renamed. 
(vi) Nomination of President of EMI and Executive Board of ECB 
The European Parliament is to be consulted on tnese nominatio.ls pursuant to 
Articles 109f and 109a of the Treaty and some criteria are even laid down for 
judging the nominees (they must have · 'recognized standing and professional 
experience in monetary and banking matters'). 
Commentary: No proposals have been made in this context in the Vecchi draft 
report. How will the Parliament decide on these nominations? What will be the 
role of our Committee? These issues need to be tackled in our Rules of 
Procedure (a more detailed note on these issues has been prepared by the 
Secretariat on the basis of American experience, PE 204.192). Amendment 1 
seeks to tackle this issue. 
(vii) Inter-institutional agreements 
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A whole series of institutional questions, including several in the field of EMU 
(Parliament relations with ECOFIN, with Central Bank System, etc.) may have to 
be tackled by means of inter-institutional agreements. Inter alia, Amendments 
3 and 7 would contribute to providing a framework for the outcome of such 
agreements to be incorporated within our Rules. 
3. More general issues 
A number of issues are more general in scope but are also important for our 
Committee and need to be tackled in the Rules of Procedure: 
(i) Composition of the Conciliation Committee in the eo-decision procedure 
Article 189b of the Treaty would provide for conciliation committees in the 
context of the co-decis~on procedure. These would be composed of the members 
of the Council or their representatives and an equal number of representatives 
of the European Parliament. 
Commentary: Sir Christopher PROUT has tackled this in his draft report but this 
has already been criticised (on the ground that it does not give sufficient 
weight to the responsible Committee). The Environment Committee has already 
made some proposals. 
(ii) Nomination of President and Members of the European Commission 
Article 158.2 of the Treaty provides for the Parliament to be consulted on the 
nomination of the Commission President, and later to take a vote on the 
Commission as a body (but not on individual Commissioners). 
Commentary: Mr Vecchi 's draft report lays down possible procedures for 
consultation of the Parliament on the nomination of the President (proposed 
Rules 29) and for the vote of approval of the Commission (proposal Rules 29(a)). 
Of particular interest to our Committee (which must deal with so many 
Commissioners) is that Vecchi suggests tpat 'Parliament's various Committees may 
ask the persons nominated for appointment as Members of the Commission to appear 
before them'. Are these suggested procedures adequate? Il would seem logical 
at the very least to insist that the Parliament be informed of which 
Commissioner will receive which portfolio, and in sufficient time to be able to 
cross-examine those Commissioners whose responsibilities will affect our 
Committee. 
(iii) Annual and periodic reports 
The Maastricht Treaty provides for a number of new annual or periodic reports, 
some of which are of direct or indirect importance for our Com~ittee: 
Article 109b, which provides for an annual report on the activities of the 
European system of Central Banks and on monetary policy 
Article 11 of the Protocol on the statute of the EMI, which provides for a 
similar report (until the ESCB is created) 
Article 130b which provides for a report every three years on progress made 
towards achieving economic and social cohesion 
Article 130p which provides for an annual report on research and 
technological development activities 
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ArtiCle 138e ·for an annual report of the Ombudsman (which mf~ht raise 
internal market problems, etc.). 
Coamentary: The existing Rules only mention the Annual General RepOrt of the 
Commission and the Annual Report of the Commission on the application of 
CoMmunity law, and Mr Rothley 's draft report suggests modificatiOns to 'these two 
Rules. Would it not be sensible to include an additional Rule ·setting up 
procedures for other annual or periodic reports, and giving the responsible 
Parliament Committees the right to draw up reports on them? 'l'his ·would be 
provided by ··Amendments No. 2 and 3. 
Conclusion 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy sUbmits the 
following amendments, whose wording is provisional and possibly in need of 
improvement, to the draft reports of the Committee on Rules of Procedure, the 
Verification of Credentials and Immunities: 
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(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights 
for the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, 
the Verification of Credentials and Immunities 
Craftsman: Mr Jean DEFRAIGNE 
At its meeting of 21 May 1992 the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' 
Rights appointed Mr Defraigne draftsman. 
At its meeting of 22, 23 and 24 September 1992 it considered the draft opinion. 
At the latter meeting it adopted the conclusions as a whole unanimously. 
The following were present for the vote: Vayssade, acting chairman; Defraigne, 
draftsman; Anastassopoules, Fontaine, Inglewood, Medina Ortega, Stauffenberg and 
de Vries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By letter of 7 January 1992 the chairman of the Committee on the Rules of 
Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities informed the President 
of Parliament of his wish to obtain from the other parliamentary co~ittees an 
assessment of the 'implications of the Maastricht Treaty for their own a~eas of 
activity'. 
At its meeting of 26 and 27 May 1992 the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizens' Rights decided to draw up an opinion on this matter for the Committee 
on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities and 
appointed Mr Defraigne draftsman. 
This opinion cannot deal with all the amendments to the Rules of Procedure 
resulting from the Maastricht Treaty, even though many of them will directly or 
indirectly affect the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights. That is 
the task of the committee responsible, which has set up an internal working 
party comprising three members, who have divided up their work as follows: Sir 
Christopher PROUT will deal with the implications of t?e Maastricht Treaty for 
the legislative procedure; Mr ROTHLEY will consider the changes to the Rules of 
Procedure which do not stem directly from the Maastricht Treaty, but which are 
designed to enable Parliament to work more effectively; and Mr VECCHI will cover 
the changes to the Rules of Procedure stemming from the Maastricht Treaty which 
have no bearing on the legislative procedure. 
This opinion must of course cover the areas within the current remit of the 
Committee on Legal 'Affairs and Citizens' Rights, i.e. examination of the legal 
basis for draft measures on which Parliament is consulted (Rule 36(3) of the 
Rules of Procedure) and its powers regarding breaches of Parliament's rights 
(Rule 55). However, on the latter point the Maastricht Treaty does not seem to 
have changed the current situation to any appreciable extent. Moreover, on 31 
October 1990 the Committee on.Legal Affairs adopted an opinion on the matter for 
the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and 
Immunities (draftsman: Mr MEDINA ORTEGA; A3-0274/90). Readers are referred to 
that opinion. 
We shall therefore consider below the question of the examination by Parliament 
of the legal basis for Community acts on which it is consulted (A). The issue 
of whether or not, in cases where the committee responsible expresses doubts, 
the Committee on Legal Affairs should be asked to deliver an opinion on the 
competence of the Community to adopt a speci~ic item of legislation should also 
be considered (B). In other words, should it be asked to deliver an opinion on 
the practical application of the subsidiarity principle provided for in Article 
3b of the Maastricht Treaty. These two issues are of course linked, because, 
prior to any assessment of which legal basis is appropriate for a Community act, 
it must first be established that the Community is in fact competent to 
legislate in a particular sphere. 
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A. EXAMINATION BY PARLIAMENT OF THE LEGAL BASES FOR COMMUNITY ACTS 
1. The importance of the choice of an appropriate legal ba.sis for Community 
acts 
rt is well known that the Community does not have general powers to legislate, 
but only powers conferred on it by the Treaties, and henceforth also by the 
Maastricht Treaty. Each of these powers is subject to specific procedural rules 
and specific conditions governing its implementation. It is imperative, 
therefore, that each Community action should be based on a specific Treaty 
provision, i.e. should have a legal basis. 
The choice of the legal basis is a matter of great importance, because it 
determines the framework for Parliament's role in the legislative process (no 
opinion, simple consultation procedure, cooperation procedure, assent procedure 
and, in the future, consultation procedure with up to three readings) and the 
rules governing the decision-making process in the Council for the adoption of 
th~ act in question (unanimity, qualified majority, simple majority). 
I 
In the first instance, it is incumbent on the Commission, as the institution 
with an exclusive right of initiative, to propose a legal basis. This choice 
has not always proved straightforward since the entry into force of the Single 
Act. It has given rise to a number of disputes between the institution~, in 
particular between the Commission and/or Parliament and the Council, revolving 
primarily around the appropriateness of Article 100A as a legal basis 
(cooperation procedure), particularly for environmental legislation (disparities 
between Articles 130S and 100A of the EEC Treaty). 
Some of these disputes have been brought before the Court of Justice, which has 
laid down certain criteria. Mention should be made in particular of two 
fundamental principles: 
under the system of Community powers and responsibilities, the choice of 
legal basis cannot depend solely on the conviction of an inst~tution that 
the objecti1e being pursued is worthwhile, but must be based on objective 
factors open to judicial review; 
such objective factors must include the objective and the substance of the 
rul. 
These principles must guide the Community institutions when they examine the 
legal basis of a Community act, and such an examination calls for a coherent, 
glob~l approach within Parliament. 
2. The need for a coherent. global approach within Parliament 
The experience of the last three years clearly shows that the choice of legal 
basis can lend itself to a variety of interpretations, particularly in areas 
which overlap (e.g. proposals pursing several objectives at the same time). 
Sec, most recently, Case C-70/88, Post-Chernobyl, European Parliament v. 
the Council, judgment of 4 October 1991 
DOC_EN\RR\232\232653 - 19 - PE 205.944/fin./Part II 
Such instances will no doubt become more frequent with the entry into force of 
the new powers and procedures provided for in the Maastricht Treaty. 
While adhering to the criteria already laid down by the Court of Justice, 
Parliament has a legitimate right, in cases where the choice of legal basiq is 
open to challenge, to interpret the provisions of the Maastrir.ht 'l'reaty in 
accordance with the spirit of that treaty, which seeks, in part, to involve the 
representatives of the peoples of Europe more closely in its implementation, 
particularly in the Community legislative process. However, opinions regarding 
the choice of legal basis must be properly reasoned and legally defensible. 
There is a risk that legal bases might come to be examined in Parliament 
primarily on the basis of considerations of political expediency which would not 
stand up to subsequent judicial review by the Court of Justice. Such a state 
of affairs might arise if, for example, the task of assessing the 
appropriateness of the legal basis was left solely to committees responsible, 
which might tend to regard observance of the criteria laid down in the case law 
of the Court of Justice as a politically unjustified legal constraint. It is 
vital, therefore, that a coherent system should be established in Parliament 
which can effectively defend the latter's rights and prerogatives with regard 
to legal bases. Parliament must ensure that such opinions hav~ a chance of 
being vindicated should an action be brought before the Court of Justice, given 
that the latter has conceded that it could call for an act of the Council or the 
Commission to be annulled 'provided that the action seeks only to safeguard 
[Parliament's] ~rerogatives and that it is founded only on submissions alleging 
breach of them' . 
3. Does the current system for examining legal bases safeguard the rights and 
prerogatives of Parliament? Suggestions for improvements 
Rule 36(3) of the Rules of Procedure states ; 
'The committee responsible shall examine the validity and appropriateness 
of the chosen legal base for any draft measure on which Parliament is 
consulted. Where it disputes the validity or the appropriateness of the 
legal base it may, before dealing with the substance of the proposal and 
after consultation with the committee responsible for legal affairs, refer 
the matter to Parliament, reporting orally or in writin~.· 
As it stands, this provision prompts three remarks: 
(a) It seems to offer the committee responsible the ootion of· submitting a 
report to Parliament, whereas the submission of a report should be a 
requirement, since the very fact that doubts persist regarding the validity or 
appropriateness 4of the legal basis chosen may rule out the application of Rules 
37, 38 or 116(1) of the Rules of Procedure; in this context, the words 'peut', 
'may' or 'kann' are inappropriate; · 
(b) Secondly, it does not stipulate that where doubts persist as to the 
validity or appropriateness of the legal basis chosen the com~ittee responsible 
should be required to request an opinion from the Committee on Legal Affairs. 
Since the word 'consultation' has been interpreted by certain committees as an 
Case C 70-88, 'comitology', Parliament v. Council, interl~cutory 
judgment of 22 May 1990, ECR I, p. 2041. 
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option rather than a requirement, on ......... the President of Parliament asked 
the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and 
Immunities to draw up an interpretation. The committee stated categorically 
that it was a requirement to be met in all cases. It is unders~ood that the 
opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs will be requested on the basis of a 
decision by the committee responsible; 
(c) It makes no mention of the procedure in plenary sitting when amendments 
concerning the validity or appropriateness of the legal basis are put to the 
vote there. There is a further problem which should not be skated over here: 
on occasion, amendments seeking to change the legal basis are employed as a 
delaying tactic. They are either tabled for the first time in plenary sitting, 
or re-tabled after being rejected in committee. In both cases, the Committee 
on Legal Affairs must deliver its opinion on the amendment(s) before it/they are 
put to the vote in plenary, and in order to spell this out it would be enough 
to incorporate the existing interpretation into the provisions of Rule 36. 
4. Parliament's right to request the Commis§ion to submit a Community act 
Mention should be made of this option open to Parliament (see A~ticle 138b of 
the Maastricht Treaty). The second subparagraph of Article 138b of the 
Maastricht Treaty states: 
'The European Parliament may, acting by a majority of its members, request 
the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it 
considers that a Community act is required for the purpose of implementing 
this Treaty. ' 
The relevant procedure will, of course, be laid down in the new Rules of 
Procedure, and will specify in particular who may submit the request to the 
plenary sitting. At all events, it seems inevitable that parliamentary 
committees will be empowered to do so, in the context of their powers and 
responsibilities. Any such request would no doubt have to be justified, 
particularly as an absolute majority is required for its approval. With that 
aim in view, and in order to avoid disputes on the legal basis to be chosen at 
a later date by the Commission, wherever possible Parliament could usefully make 
a practical, reasoned proposal of its own regarding an appropriate legal basis. 
The Committee on ~egal Affairs should be consulted before Parliament takes any 
decision, and without fail if the request makes a suggestion regarding the legal 
basis. 
B. ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUBSIDI~RITY ·PRINCIPLE 
The objective of the subsidiarity principle is to safeguard national identities 
by drawing a distinction between matters falling within the ambit of the Union 
and those which must be dealt with at national level. This principle should be 
based on the idea that the Union has at its disposal only those exclusive powers 
it needs to achieve its objectives, whereas those powers which are not 
explicitly conferred on it will continue to be exercised by the Member States. 
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Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty stipulates that: 
'The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it 
by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive compete~ce, the Community 
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only 
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not ~o beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty.' 
It is clear that the implementation of this principle will be a complex matter. 
It incorporates legal and political elements which are both subject to change 
and difficult to assess objectively. The examination by the Committee on Legal 
Affairs of directives on tobacco advertising and the liability of suppliers of 
services illustrates this point. Here again, therefore, a global, coherent 
approach by Parliament is required. Given that the Community competence in a 
specific case is being established or denied, this procedure must logically 
precede the examination of the legal basis of a Community act. It follows that 
there is a close link between the two issues, the identification of the 
appropriate legal basis implying the existence of Community competence to 
legislate. It is proposed, therefore, that alongside examinations of the 
validity of legal bases the Committee on Legal Affairs could be asked for its 
opinion on the competence of the Community to legislate in keeping with the 
subsidiarity principle provided for in Articie 3b of the Maastri~ht Treaty. 
In this connection, it would be enough to incorporate the following words into 
Rule 36(3) of the Rules of Procedure: 'The Committee responsible shall examine 
the competence of the Community to legislate and the validity and 
appropriateness of the chosen legal base for any draft measure on which 
Parliament is consulted. Where it disputes the competence of the Community to 
legislate or the validity or the appropriateness of the legal base "it ~. 
before dealing with the substance of the proposal and after consultation with 
the committee responsible for legal affairs, refer the matter to Parliament, 
reporting orally or in writing.' 
If the question of the competence of the Community to legislate is raised for 
the first time in plenary sitting, without it having been considered by the 
committee responsible, the Committee on Legal Affairs must deliver its opinion 
before the plenary sitting votes on the matter. 
It is clear that were Parliament to decide, by a majority of its Members, that 
the Community act in question did not fall within the sphere of competence of 
the Community, the Commission should be asked to withdraw its proposal, pursuant 
to Rule 39(1) of the Rules of Procedure. 
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C. CONCLUSIONS 
The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens Rights adopts the following 
conclusions and calls on the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the 
verification of Credentials and Immunities to incorporate them into its 
amendments to the Rules of Procedure: 
1. When it considers a proposal on which Parliament has been consulted, the 
committee responsible must first establish that the Community is competent 
to legislate in accordance with the subsidiarity principle provided for in 
Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty. Where doubts arise, it must ask the 
Committee on Legal Affairs for its opinion prior to considering the 
substance of the proposal. It must also consult the Committee on Legal 
Affairs when the problem arises for the first time in plenary sitting. 
2. If the committee responsible disputes the validity or the appropriateness 
of the legal basis for a proposal, it ~ refer the matter to Parliament; 
it is proposed, therefore, to replace the words 'it may ... refer' by 'it 
shall ... refer'. 
3. If the committee responsible disputes the validity or the appropriateness 
of the legal basis, it must without fail ask the Committee on Legal Affairs 
for its opinion on the matter; it is proposed, therefore, to add in the 
sixth line of Rule 36(3) the word 'obligatory' after the words 'and after'. 
4. If amendments seeking to change the legal basis are tabled in plenary 
sitting without the committee responsible having disputed the validity or 
the appropriateness of the legal basis, the committee responsible for legal 
affairs must deliver an opinion on the amendments tabled before they are 
put to the vote. In this connection, it is proposed that the 
interpretation which follows paragraph 3 should become a new paragraph of 
Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure. 
5. Finally, in a new provision of the Rules of Procedure concerning 
Article 138b of the Maastricht Treaty, it is suggested that when Parliament 
requests the Commission to propose a Community act the Committee on Legal 
Affairs should be consulted in advance so that, wherever possible, 
Parliament can indicate in its request the appropriate legal basis for the 
Community act in question. 
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OPINION 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs 
for the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification 
of Credentials and Immunities 
Craftsman: Mr LAFUENTE LOPEZ 
At the meeting of 24 September 1992 the Committee on Civil Liberties and 
Internal Affairs appointed Mr Lafuente L6pez draftsman. 
At its meetings of 29 September and 3 November 1992 the Committee considered the 
draft opinion. 
At the latter meeting the conclusions were adopted unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: Turner, chairman; Lafuente L6pez, 
rapporteuri Beazley, Van den Brink, De Piccoli, Elliott (for Peters), 
Jarzembowski, Magnani Noya (for Crawley), Piermont, Ramirez, Van Outrive. 
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OBSERVATIONS 
The Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, has considered the text 
of the two new Rules of Procedure proposed by Mr Vecchi in his draft report 
{PE 201.810) concerning Title VI of the Treaty on cooperation in the fields of 
justice and home affairs. 
The committee considers Mr Vecchi's proposals inadequate, despite their stated 
intention of implementing Article K6 of the Treaty, since the committee believes 
that the Rules of Procedure should reflect the full extent of what the current 
text of the Treaty permits with regard to the field of justice and home affairs. 
The third pillar of Maastricht, i.e. cooperation in the field of justice and 
home affairs, should be erecte9 as of now, since there can be no question that 
Parliament's Rules of Procedure can make a first-rate contribution to placing 
collaboration and cooperation on a firm basis by establishing a colloquy or 
debate, on a biannual basis at the very least, between the appropriate committee 
and the Presidents-in-Office or Members of the Council responsible for the third 
pillar, such as the Member States' Ministers of Justice and of the Interior. 
Such meetings could provide the best possible guarantee of regular control in 
this area, involving the President-in-Office of the Council and the competent 
committee. 
This debate or colloquy would oblige the President-in-Office of the Council to 
account for actions of all intergovernmental committees of senior officials 
working in the sphere of judicial matters and internal affairs, whose major 
influence on political decision-making is' inversely proportional to the scope 
they offer for Parliamentary control and influence.· 
The Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs therefore believes both 
that Rule 57 of the Rules of Procedure should be retained (given that the 
procedure therein laid down is firmly established and must continue) and that 
over and above the· unexceptionable new Rules 127a and 127b set out in the Vecchi 
report, further rules are called for to provide the appropriate procedural 
mechanisms for implementing what is specifically set out in Article K6 of the 
Treaty. 
Rule 57 of the Rules of Procedure must be retained 'because it lays down a 
procedure for parliamentary control of future policy on external affairs and 
security which is already firmly established with regard to the p~esent European 
Political Cooperation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs calls on the Committee on 
the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities as the 
committee responsible to incorporate the following amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure in its report: 
A. Rule 127(4). The President-in-Office of the Council and possibly the 
chairman of the appropriate ministers meeting in cooperation in the spheres 
of justice and home affairs shall hold meetings twice a year with 
Parliament's appropriate committee(s) to explain current ac~ivities in the 
foresaid areas and accordingly conduct a colloquy or debate on the subjects 
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put before the appropriate parliamentary committee(s) for consideration. 
In addition, the appropriate committee(s) may at any time request the 
President-in-Office of the Council or the chairman of the appropriate 
ministers to attend and provide information. 
• 
B. Rule 127(5). Twice a year, the President-in-Office of the Council shnJ 1 
report to Parliament in plenary sitting on the activities, work and 
progress achieved with regard to the matters provided for under Title VI 
of the Treaty on European Union. Parliament shall consider the report, 
and, where appropriate, a debate shall be held pursuant to the provisions 
of Rule 57 of the Rules of Procedure on issues c!etermined by the 
committee(s) responsible. 
c. Rule 127 ( 6) • Parliament may put questions or recommendations to the 
Council in the fields of justice and home affairs, in the form of proposals 
drawn up by the parliamentary committee(s) responsible. 
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0 P I N I 0 N 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Budgetary Control 
for the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the ve~ification 
of Credentials and Immunities 
Draftsman: Mrs Annemarie GOEDMAKERS 
At its meeting of 14 July 1992 the Committee on Budgetary. Control appointed 
Mrs Goedmakers draftsman. 
At its meeting of 14 September 1992 it considered the draft opinion. 
At that meeting it adopted the conclusions as a whole unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: Lamassoure, chairman; Holzfuss, vice-
chairman; Goedmakers, draftsman; Kellett-Bowman, Langes, Pasty, Theato and 
Tomlinson. 
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I. INTROPUCTION 
1. The Maastricht Treaty has brought with it significant changes in the sphe=e 
of budgetary control, as regards both the technical control exercised by lhe 
Court of Auditors and the political control exercised by Parliament, as the 
authority responsible for discharge. 
2. Many of the changes or innovations introduced in the Treaty are not new in 
the absolute sense, since they include practices which already existed or non-
constitutional provisions (e.g. provisions of the financial regulation making 
the comments which form part of the discharge decision compulsory). 
3. However, the adoption of the new Treaty makes these practices and provisions 
equivalent to constitutional law, which obviously makes them binding on 
Community institutions and national administrations. 
4. As a result the European Parliament's internal Rules of Procedure should be 
adapted to the new rules, especially in cases where changes in internal rules 
may affect Parliament's external relations with the other institutions and, more 
generally, with subjects of Community law. 
5. Three main sectors of budgetary control are affected by the changes brought 
in by the Maastricht Treaty: the discharge procedure, relations with the Court 
of Auditors and Parliament's right of inquiry. A fourth sector, the control 
exercised by Parliament and its committees over the implementation of the 
current budget, although not specifically dealt with in the new Treaty, 
nevertheless needs to be codified to take account of long-established practice. 
II. CHANGES TO BE MADE TO THE DISCHARGE PROCEDURE 
6. The discharge procedure is regulated by Rule 68 of Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure which makes reference, as far as detailed rules are concerned, to 
Annex V (procedure for the consideration and adoption of decisions on the 
granting of a discharge). The rules set out in the Annex should be expanded, 
to include a series of new rules contained in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Documents, reports and acts referred to the Committee on Budgetary Control 
7. The documents on which the discharge procedure is based, mentioned in 
Article 1 of Annex V, hitherto consisted of the revenue and expenditure account 
(including the financial analysis and the balance sheet forwarded by the 
Commission) and the Court of Auditors' annual report accoml)anied by the 
Institutions' answers and the Council recommendation. Article 206 of the new 
Treaty has now made the 'relevant special reports' by the Court of Auditors as 
important as the annual report. Such reports should ,therefore be included among 
the basic documents for the discharge procedure. 
8. Similarly, the essential documents to be assessed by the discharge authority 
should include the statement which the Court of Auditors submits to the Council 
~he European Parliament. pursuant to Article 188c( 2 l of the Maastricht 
Tr~~~ in which it assures them as to the reliability of the accounts and the 
~.il.Y- and regularity of the underlying transactions. It is clear how 
important this statement is for the granting of the discharge: if the 
Commission's accounts were not covered by the statement in question, Parliament 
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might feel it necessary to refuse the discharge or to alter the figures (cf. in 
the annex, the amendment to Article 1 of Annex V). 
The binding force of the comments accompanying the discharge decision 
IJ. 'l'he obligations inherent in the com~t~ents contained in the resolution 
attached to the discharge decision were hitherto considered to be non-legal 
obligations, since the Treaties did not state that they were obligatory. The 
situation changes radically with the provision in Article 206(3) of the new 
Treaty to the effect that the Commission must 'take all appropriate steps to act 
on the observations in the decisions giving discharge'. The legally binding 
force deriving from this provision may from now on allow Parliament, in cases 
where the Commission has not taken the measures required by the discharge 
decision, to invoke Article 175 of the Treaty which provides for action to be 
prouqht before the Court of Justice 'should the Council or Commission, in 
infringement of this Treaty, fail to act'. A new paragraph could therefore be 
added to Article 7 of Annex V, concerning the implementation of discharge 
decisions (see annex). 
The binding force of acts other than the discharge decision 
10. Article 206 of the Maastricht Treaty not only makes discharge decisions 
legally binding but also makes the 'other observations by the European 
Parliament relating to the execution of expenditure' binding. This is an 
important new point which assigns legal significance to the commants contained 
in the resolutions adopted by the European Parliament outside the discharge 
Qrocedure, but which still concern budgetary control, often based on special 
reports by the Court of Auditors. This new point should be taken into account 
in Article 7(2) of Annex V (see annex). Incidentally, it should be noted that 
although Article 206(3) appears to be saying that the comments accompanying the 
recommendations on discharge adopted by the Council are compulsory, they cannot 
actually be regarded as such. Recommendations of this kind are in fact an act 
within the discharge procedure and as such cannot have effects outside the 
procedure, in particular vis-a-vis the Commission, to whom only the final act 
of the discharge procedure is addressed. 
III. RELATIONS WITH THE COURT OF AUDITORS 
11. Article 4 of the Maastricht Treaty defines the Court of Auditors as a 
Community institution. This means that certain aspects of relations with the 
Court of Auditors, which hitherto were dealt with on an informal and unofficial 
basis, may from now on be regulated as relations between institutions: 
the President of the Court of Auditors first submitted his institution's 
annual report at a plenary sitting of Parliament during the discharge 
procedure for the 1990 financial year. This established that the President 
of the Court of Auditors can make statements similar to those envisaged in 
Rule 56 of the Rules of Procedure for the other institutions (Commission, 
Council and Foreign Ministers). This possibility of access and of making 
statements could be formalised in the Rules of Procedure (see Annex I, with 
the amendment constituting a Rule 56a); 
the Court of Auditors makes a substantial contribution to Parliament's 
work, as the budgetary control and discharge authority. It is therefore 
obvious that the coordination of the Court of Auditors' work programme with 
DOC_EN\RR\232\232653 - 29 - PE 205.944/fin./Part II 
Parliament's policy decisions is an important matter of priority. Ti1e 
Rules of Procedure could allow the President of the Court of Auditors th~ 
possibility of making statements about the work programme, 9ither to the 
Committee on Budgetary Control or at plenary sittings. The ensuirtg debate 
should facilitate coordination of the priorities and guidelines of the two 
institutions (see Annex I, with the amendment constituting Rule ~6a). 
IV. PARLIAMENT'S RIGHT OF INQUIRY 
12. The new Article.138c in the Maastricht Treaty states that Parliament may 
set up a Committee of Inquiry to 'investigate ... alleged contraventions or 
maladministration in the implementation of Community law'. This right has 
certain limits: there is the need to safeguard 'the powers conferred by this 
Treaty on other institutions or bodies' and a ban on carrying out inquiries if 
'the alleged facts are being examined before a Court and while the case is still 
subject to legal proceedings'. 
13. The practicalities of exercising this right should be decided on jointly 
by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. It is therefore 
difficuit at this stage to envisage what changes should be made to Rule 109(3) 
of Parliament's Rules of Procedure which regulate the present right of inquiry, 
until the agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission has been concluded. Suffice it to say that everything concerning the 
internal workings of Parliament's bodies responsible for exercising the new 
right of inquiry should be subject to the Bules of Procedure and Parliament's 
exclusive prerogative should be sanctioned in the above-mentioned agreement. 
14. F'or a variety of reasons it would be appropriate for one or more members 
of the Committee on Budgetary Control to sit on a committee on inquiry: 
The need to avoid any conflict or overlapping of powers between the 
temporary committee and the Committee on Budgetary Control (which would 
also be in conflict with Article 138c of the Treaty, which states that the 
right of inquiry must be exercised without prejudice to the powers · 
conferred by the Treaty when other institutions or bodies); 
it was the Committee on Budgetary Control which first requested the need 
for Parliament to be assigned a power of inquiry accompanied by a legal 
power of invesfigation similar to that of the parliaments of the Member 
States (Goedmakers report - A-233/90, together with the resolution of 22 
November 1990) ; 
the need to avoid duplication: the Committee on Budgetary Control already 
has a special system for obtaining information from the Commission. This 
system, which consists of an exchange of letters between the two 
institutions is now reinforced by Article 206(2) of the Maastricht Treaty 
which states that 'in connection with the exercise of its powers over the 
implementation of the budget, the European Parliament may ask to hear the 
Commission give evidence with regard to the execution of expenditure or the 
operation of financial control ·systems. The Commission shall submit any 
necessary information to the European Parliament at the latter's request.' 
Parliament is assigned these powers in its role as discharge authority and 
they are actually exercised by the Committee on Budgetary Control. A 
parliamentary committee on inquiry will in many cases by guided by this 
work, which is more substantial in the field in quest1on. 
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V. MONITORING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUDGET OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL 
YEAR: the 'Notenboom' procedure and the work carried out pursuant to the 
gowers of control of Parliament and the parliamentary committees concerned 
15. According to long established practice, control over the implementation of 
the budget is carried out not only after the event, via the discharge procedure, 
but also during the financial year. 
16. The latter type of control is carried out either monthly, by the Committee 
on Budgetary Control on the basis of information supplied by the Commission and, 
for example, by the system of prompt recording of EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure, 
or by means of checks carried out in individual sectors of the Community budget 
by the committees concerned (often on the recommendation of the Committee on 
Budgetary Control), or, finally, by means of the so-called 'Notenboom' 
procedure. The procedure consists of a debate in plenary before Parliament's 
first reading of the budget, on the basis of a question tabled jointly by the 
Committees on Budgets and Budgetary Control, in order to ascertain the main 
problems which have arisen or may arise during the financial year. Both of 
these kinds of control over the administration of the current financial year (by 
the individual committees and Parliament meeting in plenary) are extremely 
important, inter alia for the purpose of the assessments to be made during the 
budgetary procedure; however, they have not yet been sanctioned in Parliament's 
Rules of Procedure, which would be useful since written rules could clarify 
important procedural details. If the rules are codified, it would in particular 
be important to specify the detailed rules for and the form of the written 
answers which the Commission would be called upon to provide within one month 
in reoly to questions put by the various committees. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
17. On t~ basis of the above observations, the Committee on Budgetary Control 
calls on the Committee on the Rules of Procedure to consider the possibility of 
incorporating in Parliament's Rules of Procedure the amendments which the 
Maastricht Treaty has made necessary in the field of budgetary control, on the 
basis of the draft amendments attached to this opinion. 
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OPINION 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Institutional Affairs. 
for the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification 
of Credentials and Immunities 
Draftsman: Mrs Adelaide AGLIETTA 
At its meeting of 26 February 1992, the Committee on Institutional Affairs 
appointed Mrs Adelaide AGLIETTA draftsman. 
At its meetings of 22 and 23 April 1992, 19 and 20 May 1992, 23 and 24 September 
1992, 8 and 9 October 1992, 18 and 19 March 1993 and 1 and 2 April 1993, it 
considered the draft opinion. 
At the last meeting it adopted the conclusions as a whole unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: Oreja Aguirre, chairman, Melis, vice-
chairman; ,Aglietta, draftsman; Boissiere, Bourlanges, De Giovanni, Glinne, 
Marinho, Puerta and Roumeliotis. 
• 
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I . .Introduction 
'l'hu 'l'rcaty on European Union signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992 does not 
fundamentally satisfy Parliament's hopes, either with regard to the changes to 
the Community system to be made in the short term, or with a view to the 
creation of a true Union on a federal basis. In particular, it does not solve 
the problem of the democratic deficit: on the contrary, the substantial widening 
of powers unaccompanied by adequate institutional reforms could considerably 
increase this deficit. 
Dissatisfaction with the results of the intergovernmental negotiations must not, 
however, lead us to abandon the line· which we chose, under the guidance of 
Altiero SPINELLI, after the signing of the Single Act and which was put into 
effect in the Rules of Procedure adopted in application of the Single Act. The 
principle of taking full advantage of the possibilities of reforms, even though 
unsatisfactory - contained in the resolution of 16 January 1986 - is confirmed 
again in Parliament's resolution on the Maastricht Treaty. This attitude, as 
the implementation of the Single Act demonstrates, is essential to maintain and 
strengthen the credibility of the European Parliament.· It will, however, be 
necessary to take particular care to clarify Parliament's positions during the 
procedures to ensure that they are well expressed outside and, if necessary, 
distinguished from the final decisions. 
This must be the first point of reference for reform of Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure. The task will be to insert elements into the Rules which will bring 
out all the possibilities of the new provisions to increase the democratic 
workings of the Union. Firstly, this principle involves careful analysis of the 
new procedures, to put into effect the new powers invested in Parliament and 
therefore to require that the other institutions show full respect for the new 
rules of the game and a commitment to making them work. Secondly, it involves 
internal provisions to ensure that the procedures are effective and rapid, both 
to respect the provisions relating to the new procedures, and to respect the 
political deadlines which some of them impose. 
The second principle to take into account for reform of the Rules of Procedure 
concerns respect for the fundamental principles of the Treaty; this lays down 
that the European Parliament, the first legislative organ to examine a proposal 
for legislation, must check the constitutionality of the texts proposed. 
Essentially, Parliament, which acquires powers (though incomplete) of 
legislative eo-decision, must carry out its function as legislator to the full. 
As a corollary to this new role, it is also vital for legislative texts adopted 
by Parliament to be legally correct and for Parliament itself to be able to 
ensure that the decisions it takes are completely consistent. 
II. The new powers of the European Parliament 
A. The appointment of the Commission. 
Hitherto, Parliament has already been consulted informally (Enlarged Bureau) on 
the new President and, under its own internal rules, expressed a vote of 
confidence in the Commission, though without legal effects. 
This procedure is now laid down in the Treaty with quite precise legal 
consequences. 
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What is new is that Parliament has the power to pass or rejec.:t a vote of 
confidence on the Commission before the Commission can take office. 'I'Li 3 
decisional phase is ·preceded by consultation of Parliament on who shall take on 
the presidency of the future Commission. 
Parliament - which had asked to express a binding vote on the appointm~r.t of the 
President - should: 
express its opinion on the President appointed in plenary sitting; 
hear and assess, via an appropriate procedure, the people appointed as 
Commissioners, after distribution of the portfolios and before the vote of 
confidence; 
express its vote of confidence, taking account of the outline programme 
which the new Commission will submit; 
establish a very high quorum, to ensure that the vote of confjdence has the 
necessary political weight. 
The point is to ensure that maximum importance is attached to decisions and 
effective control is exercised over the appointment of the Commission. 
Still on the subject of the appointment of the Commission, it should be borne 
in mind that in principle Parliament's term of office will coincide with the 
Commission's mandate. This means that the appointment procedures should 
underline the relationship between the popular vote and the choice of a new 
Commission. As a general rule, the vote on the President should take place at 
the first working part-session of the newly-elected Parliament. 
B. Legislative initiative 
The Treaty gives Parliament - acting by a majority of its me.mbers -:- a power of 
legislative initiative, though phrased in a reductive form, without affecting 
(at least formally) the Commission's monopoly, and with considera[lle uncertainty 
as to the legal consequences of Parliament's power. In any case this is a power 
formally identified in the Treaty. The problems to be tackled from the point 
of view of the Rules of. Procedure are: 
the relationship with the Commission and in particular the reference to an 
at least political obligation on the part of the Commission to act on 
initiatives proposed by Parliament; 
methods of defining the procedures to identify legislative initiatives as 
distinct from strictly political initiatives; this might involve making 
a distinction, in exercising this power, between actual proposals for 
legislation and formal invitations to the Commission to submit a proposal 
for legislation itself; 
recognition (finally!) of the right of ind1vidual Members to submit 
proposals for legislation, without creating any disper5ion of Parliament's 
legislative initiatives; this means that, with such arr.ple opportunity for 
Parliament to call for legislative initiatives, there should be an 
appropriate 'filter' system to ensure that Parliament only considers and 
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votes - according to the majority laid down in the Treaty - on those 
proposals which are recognized as a priority. 
c. Legislative procedure 
we will not now go into all the problems posed by the numerous legislative 
procedures, but focus only on three questions which result directly from the 
Treaty: 
1. Qrr~~king of the constitutionality of laws 
'i'lle Treaty stipulates that, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall legislate only in accordance with the principle of 
suhsidiarity. This provision is particularly important, first of all because 
it limits excessive centralization which could distort the face of the Union, 
and also because it clearly defines the Union's scope for action. It is 
therefore precisely in Parliament's interest to ensure that this principle is 
respected. Furthermore, the Treaty introduces the rule that laws on expenditure 
must, in one way or another, provide for financial cover. Finally, the Treaty 
formally introduces - though worded in a particularly unfortunate way - the 
obligation to respect fundamental rights. 
The new provisions on eo-decision make the question of legal bases much more 
important: it is now no longer a question simply of checking the 
appropriateness of a procedure which, in fact, in any case left the power of 
decision-making to a single institution. With the introduction of the eo-
decision procedure the institutions actually making the decision may vary; 
Parliament may play a purely consultative role or participate even formally in 
the decision, and above all prevent a decision it considers unacceptable. 
This set of conditions forces us to reflect on the need for Parliament to make 
sure, by appropriate means, that they, and the 'constitutional' rules in 
general, are respected. 
Essentially, Parliament should exercise what is known in the Member States as 
constitutional control, and which is exercised by a specific parliamentary body, 
leaving the last word, in case of dispute, to the plenary. Such control should 
allow Parliament to block from the very outset of the procedure any proposals 
manifestly contrary to the Treaty or especially harmful to its own prerogatives. 
2. The guality of legislative texts 
The Treaty, as we have seen, gives Parliament a role as eo-legislator, albeit 
an uncertain one. 
This means, amongst other things, that the legislative texts which Parliament 
produces must be legally correct. At the same time this requirement must 
neither in theory nor in practice shift the decision-making power towards some 
technical organ. It is therefore necessary to establish a 'legal quality 
control' of texts; but the organ which Garries this out must only have the task 
of giving a technical opinion to the rapporteur, the plenary or committee 
chairman and, possibly, to those tabling amendments to legislative texts. 
3. ~ng of acts adopted by eo-decision 
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Finally, the Treaty stipulates that the President of the European Parliament 
shall be co-signatory to acts produced through the eo-decision procedure. 
In this case the President is acting autonomously. 
Procedure should simply confirm this. 
D. The eo-decision procedure 
Probably the Rules of 
The new procedure gives Parliament limited legislative power. This is put into 
effect i'n a series of stages (first reading, second reading with first 
conciliation procedure, second conciliation procedure), in which Council and 
Parliament are essentially on an equal footing, and a final stage in which 
Parliament may only overturn - and by a large majority - any unilateral decision 
of the Council, and is therefore in a much weaker position. 
From the point of view of the Rules of Procedure, an attempt should be made to 
give prime importance from the outset to the Parliament-Council dialogue; 
essentially, Parliament's main positive power is to f0rce the existing 
majorities in the Council to seek a compromise, unless the whole procedure is 
to come to nothing at the end of the second reading or at the end of the 
procedure itself. 
The drafters of the Treaty do in fact go in this direction, establishing the two 
conciliation procedures and even, in the second, limiting the Commission's 
mediating role to give the two arms of the legislative authority the maximum 
opportunity to reach a compromise between any qualified majority in the Council 
and the majority of Parliament. 
The role of the conciliation procedure - essential in the second round of 
conciliation, because the two delegations decide, subject to ratification by the 
two institutions - requires careful reflection on the composition of the 
Parliament delegation. There is no way that a quasi-technical composition, like 
that for the present conciliation ('concertation') procedure, can satisfy the 
demands of this procedure. It is also necessary to give the delegation ·a 
certain degree of stability and also some specialization according to subject. 
Thought should also be given to the deadlines scattered throughout the eo-
decision procedure which, if not met, lead purely and simply to a loss of power 
by Parliament: this goes for the order of business and also for the 
establishment of instruments for rapid decision on a given subject. 
Finally, the introduction of the eo-decision procedure strengthens the theory 
that it is in Parliament's specific interest to bring together - where 
permitted under the Treaty - all the legislative procedures, in order to make 
the most of all the possible advantages of the various procedures. This policy 
above all reflects the need put forward by Parliament to act as eo-legislator 
in all legislative matters. 
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E. Assent in areas other than international agreements 
'rhe procedure for assent of the European Parliament, introduced both for 
constitutional matters (acting by a majority of its members) and ordinary law, 
1s not particularly satisfactory. While in fact, on one hand, it is quite 
appropriate for international agreements which, at a formal level, r~quira a yes 
or no from the legislative authority, on the other hand it completely distorts 
the legislative procedure. The Rules of Procedure should nevertheless seek to 
introduce two readings and establish a form of conciliation procedure with the 
Council. 
F. The right of inquiry 
The Treaty gives Parliament a right of inquiry, subject to detailed prov1s1ons 
to be determined by interinstitutional agreement. It is therefore difficult at 
this stage to formulate guidelines for regulating this procedure. It will be 
sufficient to point out that the Treaty confirms the concept, already contained 
in Parliament's Rules of Procedure, that the appointment of a committee of 
inquiry depends on the power of initiative of a minority and that, in any case, 
the inquiry now takes on a role which is also of legal importance. 
III. Other prov1s1ons of the Treaty which make it necessary to change the 
Rules of Procedure to ensure effective action by Parliament 
A. New provisions on common foreign and security policy and internal affairs 
and justice 
In these areas Parliament has no decision-making power. 
The Treaty confirms the right to table questions to the Council and gives 




The Rules of Procedure should aim to allow Parliament to take prompt action, in 
order at least to exercise effectively what little power of control and 
orientation it has. 
1 . W1 th regard to questions, the deadline for the Council to reply to 
Parliament should be based on political realities and not five weeks, a 
time limit which was set largely for bureaucratic reasons. 
2. Normally it is the competent committees which should receive information, 
in confidence if necessary·. However, in cases of major political interest, 
information should be given in plenary. 
3. Consultation must come before decisions. Thus it could be envisaged that, 
for urgent questions, Parliament should be consulted before a 'Foreign 
Affairs' Council, with this already on the agenda. For other questions 
provision should be made for a normal consul tat ion, possibly via an 
accelerated procedure. Consultation does not necessarily have to conclude 
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with a vote on a resolution: in many cases debate could be sufficient to 
clarify positions. 
4. The power of recommendation, formalized in the Treaty, gives Parliament. 
by formal act, the right to propose the method of tackling a probl£'r:: of 
foreign policy or internal affairs. 
The recommendation should be fairly solemn in form and be used only for 
important matters, naturally via a specially rapid procedure, where 
appropriate, by delegation to the appropriate committee. 
In any case, the role of the Commission, which now has the power uf 
initiative, should not be-neglected. Its relationship of confidence w]th 
Parliament requires, on one hand, that it guarantee information even beyo11d 
that given by the Council, and, on the other hand, that it discuss, a~ f.:-. 
as possible, its initiatives with Parliament. In addition it should Lo:. 
be forgotten that the Commission has a dual function, in also carryinc,r c1·+. 
an essential role with regard to the Community's external relations. 
Finally, all these PFerogatives require adaptation of the calendars of 
parliamentary meetings to political deadlines and, therefore, greater 
flexibility in the meetings of parliamentary bodies and plenary itself. 
B. The Ombugsman 
Parliament has the power/duty to appoint an Ombudsman and, after seeking an 
opinion from the Commission and with the· approval of the Council, to lay down 
the regulations an4 general conditions governing the performance of the 
Ombudsman's duties. The appointment of the Ombudsman requires the introduction 
of specific provisions in the Rules of Procedure. 
There is also the problem of considera.tion of the annual report and the special 
reports. While the annual report is essentially an opportunity to discuss 
general problems of the relationship between the cit-izen and- the Community 
administration, the special reports may raise serious problems as soon as they 
occur. It will be up to the committee responsible to alert plenary where 
necessary. 
c. The exercise of parliamentary control 
The relationship of confidence with the Commission implies a strengthening of 
democratic control on the operation of the Union. Furthermore, the Treaty 
stipulates that the Commission and, in certain cases, the Council, should 
present to Parliament a large number of new sectoral reports, either at fixed 
dates or periodically. Finally, the role of budgetary control is emphasized in 
the Treaty. 
These new elements call for greater dynamism in the procedures for control, both 
at the level of parliamentary committees and in plenary. It follows that it 
would be advisable to avoid falling into routine control procedures (for example 
by adopting identical and respective resolutions every year) and to choose 
specific moments for action, such as, for example, brief d€bates in committee 
or in plenary in the presence of the Commission and, possibly, the Council, 
reserving formal acts at the end of the debate for more important questions, 
especially where there is a disagreement with the Commission or Council. 
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Thought should also be given to the fact that control must not only be carried 
out a posteriori, but also during the course of the procedures. This goes for 
fore1gn and security policy and for internal affairs, and for the conduct of the 
Commission in the case of legislative procedures and in negotiation of treaties. 
Finally, we must not neglect - as unfortunately we do to a great extent 
control of the follow-up to Parliament's acts at Community level. Parliament 
must also, in cooperation with the national parliaments, exercise control over 
the implementation of ComMunity legislation in the Member States, naturally 
respecting the competences of the national institutions. 
IV. International treaties 
Depending on the subject, the Treat¥ stipulates op1m.on or assent on the 
ratification of treaties drawn up by the Community. Commercial policy is the 
exception, save for specific cases where assent is required. 
Parliament therefore has good reason to review the_procedures through which it 
is consulted (or simply informed) on the preparatory stages and on negotiation. 
With the new provisions, Parliament gives its assent by a simple majority. It 
could be useful, to strengthen the value of its decisions, for Parliament to fix 
a high quorum for the vote on international agreements. 
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